It is almost impossible to imagine what the tremendous impact on human history 'NOUld be if we were to receive a return manuscript in a bottle, so to speak, or sane other manifestation of an answer to our hopes and inquiries.
Humans are not alone in the uni verse! There are other intelligent, sentient beings in the universe who could, perhaps, give us their wisdan and their perspective to break through the terrible and seemingly insoluble problems that we face. And perhaps best of all, we might fin:i sane way to return to tlle harnDnious and natural state of living that eludes us in our Imlch synthesized world.
But sane would ask why we nust search the far reaches of the universe for a consciousness different fran our own, when we live on a planet that presents us with a ~erful multiplicity of life, vibrant with species that we know virtually nothing about, and fran whose intelligence and adaptive
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
28 skills we could gratefully learn. We liter ally have "alien" life and a presentimmt of consciousness right at our feet and all a round us in every environment that humankind itself has o:::me to live in, and BaDe that are as yet uninhabitable for us.
Animal life fran insects to higher mantnals abounds on our planet, though in nearly every respect it is threatened by human maladaptation to the enviroI1l'OOllt and our lack of mrlerstan:li.ng of its fragile interrelationships.
Until recently there have been pitifully few attempts by humans to ccmnunicate with and "learn the wisdan of" our fellow beings an Earth. But is it possible for us to learn the "language" and the true capacities of other animals?
Do animals have intelligence at all? '!he answers to these questions are vital to our ability to live an and manage this planet.
And they are vital to us if we are ever really to understand our own capaci ties, as well.
Evolution and Ca1sciousness
Long before Olarles Darwin developed the scientific theory of biological evolution and twentieth century astrofhysicists developed a theory for the evolution of planets, stars, and galaxies, the fhilosofhers of Irxtia p.1t forth a concept of evolution that remarkably parallels our m:dern scientific theories. Stories of creation and evolution found ;in the ancient H.iJiiu scriptures, the Upmishads, sane three thousand years old, tell of a kind of consciousness that pervades all of crea tion.
'!his consciousness they called "At man," which, aware only of itself, began with the rrost basic o:xnpourrls, such as rocks and minerals, and through a process of successive o:mplexity and ccmbination of rrolecules, crossed the threshold fran inorganic to 0r ganic matter. And again through a process of ocxnbination, canplexity, and "karmic" exper ience (learning) , which the Hindus called "reincarnation" or rebirth after the perish ing of the previous temporal fonn, CXJllScious ness noved up the ladder of creation fran plant, to insect, to vertebrate, and through the phyla and classes of vertebrates, finally t..o arrive at the cra.ming achievement of creation-humanity.
Humanity itself is con tinually in the process of refinement throuqh this sare law of reincarnation.
At each stage of this progression all that has been gathered fran previous stages remains as a Part of the newly c:xxrplex being; nothing is lost; rather, each new stage accrues new material for its life process while keeping vestiges of the old.
When we CXJllSider the miracle of lifethat is, that raw matter has becane animate and sensate through the fifteen billion years of the universe' s existence, that the whole of our existence has becane so much rrore than the sum of our rrolecular Parts-it is not hard to feel the profound awe that the an cients felt for creation. Looking about them and seeing the vast array of plant and animal life, each with its own niche and set of behaviors, and also seeing that hmnans pos sessed many of the traits of other animals, the ancients set down their metaphysical rule of evolution.
we continue to this day to grapple with our understanding of all that carne to pass. All of the mind's activities are based on the axis of reality--thooght itself.
Taken to its ex treme, external reality is not even a proven fact, and the organism is trapped within the walled city of the mind.
HCMever, in the latter Part of the twen tieth century, IlDst philosophers and scien tists, inclu:ling those who study artificial intelligence (the science of cybernetics) , are willing to postulate the existence of sane fODll of "consciousness" and are not afraid to lex>k for it in the study of animal and human behavior and the intricacies of neurophysiology.
One thing they do agree on-the rrore o:mplex the organism, the great er its capacity and diversity of nental states.
'lhat is, the o:mplexityof mental experience and awareness seems to correlate directly with the canplexity and structure of the brain which sits at the center of the body' s neurological system. Most scientists would directly link an organism's "nental states" to the capacity of its brain, and the ratio of its brain size to body mass.
Another yardstick for measur ing awareness is behavior-how an organism' s . . experiences The homological construction of the whole frame [of the body] in the nenbers of the same class is intelligible if we admit their descent fran a camon progenitor, together with their subsequent a daptation to diversifiEd condi tions.
• With respect to de velopnent, we can clearly tm<ler stand on the principle of varia tions supervening at a rather late embryonic period, and being inher itEd at a corresp:>nding period, hc1w it is that the embryos of wonder fully different fonns should still retain roore or less perfectly, the structure of the CCIIIlInIl progenitor.
In o:rder to tm<lerstand the existence of rudimentary organs, we have only to suppose that a progen itor p:>ssessEd the parts in ques tion in a perfect state and that under changEd habits of life they became greatly rEducEd either fran simply disuse or through the natur al selection of the individuals which were least enCl.UIlberEd by a superfluous part. [l] Carl sagan, a notEd astroIiJ.ysicist, was one of the designers of the capsules in the Voyager spacecraft mentionEd above.
In his book, The Dragons of Ffien, sagan has upjated the observations of Darwin sagan then makes an intriguing analogy. The genetic encoding that is carried through the DNA in chromosomes can be ccmpared with all other fonns of information and broken into canponent pieces.
Since, as sagan p:>ints out, there are four different nucleo tides in each DNA roolecule, and in a single hUflWl chromosome there are five billion sets of nucleotides, we suddenly arrive at the fact that there are twenty billion bits of information in a single hUflWl chramosame. If this were to be comparEd with the binary bits of information in a canputer, sagan makes the astounding p:>int that a single hUflWl chramo some carries the same information as a four thousand voltnne library, with each volume containing five hundrEd pages and each page three hundred words.
The genetic instructions of the DNA molecule, which are randomly mutatEd by envi ronmental factors, allow for either success ful or unsuccessful adaptation of the organ ism to its envirornnent.
But as organisms became roore canplex and as the IiJ.ysical envi ronment becaIre subject to quicker cycles of transformation and uIiJ.eaval, as during ice ages, the chances for a successful, purely genetic transformation to meet the new condi tions became roore problematic.
For these larger, roore O3lI.Plex organisms, sane new system of survival and adaptive information needEd to be developed, and that, according to sagan, was the extragenetic growth and specialization of the nervous system. Randan genetic transformation of the organism had reachEd its practical limits for success (for every success, thousands of failures would occur) 1 henceforth, information relevant to survival and propagation, and the enhancEd sensory systems to convey new information, would be processEd in the brain. The brain as we know it today, with its recognizable divisions, had already evolved sane five hundrEd million years ago. It continued to grow and specialize as life fonns changEd fran marine to amphibian to reptilian and, finally, to manmalian. At each of these stages, species have developed which have made optimum use of their brains within the taxa limits. The roore intelligent of these animals have had larger brains to run their bodies.
The fact that there is excess brain capacity over and above that which is needEd for simple biological main tenance is often seen as an indication of p:>tential intelligence.
In roodern times, chimpanzees, dolprlns, whales, and hUflWlS BEIWEEN THE spocms. In his work, as in lOOst other scientific studies, the yardstick for measuring brain capabilities is usually the human brain. This bas sane obvious drawbacks as far as the question of animal conscious ness is concerned; for, aIlOng other reasons, when they are experimentally mmip.1lated, animals cannot "report" their sensations and feelings as a hum:m can.
Nevertheless, the underlying neuroIilysiology shows sane inter esting similarities between animals and hu mans.
Maclean has studied. a number of species and found that there is an older brain which he calls the reptilian ccxnplex, because it was the major brain for reptiles. going back to the age of the dinosaurs.
The midbrain, also called the limbic system, surrounds the reptilian ccmplex.
Finally, the forebrain, or neocortex, developed its pr:i.ma.cy after the other two and usually sits atop or surrounds them. Maclean emphasizes this in the follow ing dramatic way:
Speaking allegorically, we might illIagine that when a psychiatrist bids the patient lie on the couch, he is asking him to stretch out alongside a horse and a croco dile. [2] Since the three divisions of the brain are fouOO in all kinds of an:i.ma.ls, fran the lOOst primitive to the lOOst ccmplex, we must take a nore detailed look at their functions.
'!he Reptilian Brain
'!he reptilian brain, or hiOO brain, is the lOOst basic part of the upper nervous system. it is often referred to as the brain stem, which feeds directly into the central nervous system at its lower ern. It is here that the brain begins to process the inp.xt of the sensory systems of the body-touch, heat, cold, etc.
It is here also that the direc tions imparted to the lOOtor system (nerves that activate the heart, lungs, muscles, and other organs) proceed directly into the cen tral nervous system. It, of course, exists in ·sane fonn in species fran fish to humans. It is called the limbic system because it is associated with the functioning of the limbs of the body and the refinement of their uses.
I t is a nore .I;XJWerful part of the brain, in the sense that a ccmp.lter with nr:>re capa city and greater speed is considered nr:>re powerful.
Psychologically, it afI)ears to be the center of strong em:>tions, such as rage/fear, pleasure/pain, and rejoicing/sor rowing. The limbic system's ablity to affect our body with the release of strong endocrine chemicals is often reflected in our speech, as when we refer to our em:>tions with IiJ.rases like "love in our hearts" and "anguish in our guts," or when primitive societies locate a "dem::m" in the liver, 1xJwels, etc. sane of the behaviors which are said· to be controlled by this part of the brain are flight/fight, tension/relaxation, hunting, hoarding, ag gression, bonding, searching, flocking, and rejoicing.
Carl sagan bas noted the following about the evolution of the limbic system:
There To this I 'ItUuld add the poignant wait of the IOOther sea turtle, after journeying perhaps thousands of miles, at the edge of the surf for those of her hatchlings who can wake it to the safety of the water on the day after they hatch.
This scene probably stretches back tens of millions of years to the priIOOr dial age of the reptile. Still, there can be no doubt that the limbic system represents a great evolutionary advance toward the broad ening of "mental" capability and behavior over the IOOre primitive reptilian cx:mplex. We have, indeed, gone beyond mere storage and retrieval of our extrasana tic infonnation (books, libraries, tapes, films, etc. ) when we attempt to create our own thinking machines.
The very recent and still fonning convergence of llDdern };hilo soJ;hy of the mind, neuroJ;hysiology, and the science of cybernetics has focused the debate over intelligence on the search for artifi cial intelligence.
If it is. possible to reduce consciousness and intelligence to an electrical""1lIeChani.cal set of programs and equations that would rival the working of the brain, we could do away forever with carte sian dualism and simply work on a greater and greater aggregate of infonnation proces sing.
We could then nnve through the scale of J;hylo-intelligence until we arrived at the duplication of human intelligence.
We could "reconcile synapses with souls. II James Gleick asks, "can machines be taught the most human of human traits-creativity, inspira tion, imagination?n [6] Gleick's article focuses on the work of Douglas Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach, in his efforts to recreate the subtle ties of the human thought process.
The key ingredients, according to Hofstadter, are:
Perception. Mem::>ry. Analogy. Re grouping.
Abilities to do very simple things, to take things apart and put them back together again in new ways, {are] so much at the root of creativity.
when a canposer like Bach canposed fugues, you can practically see the wheels churning.
You can see Bach taking things apart and putting them back together-you can see that incredi ble fluidity.n [?] Hofstadter's \OiOrk is controversial, because every cybernetic scientist would admit that an intuitive, surprising, and often irration al human being could hopelessly outflank. even the II¥JSt formidable ccmpxter, as depicted in Arthur C. Clarke' s n2001--A Space OOyssey. n It is a question of the perception, meIlDry, analogy, and regrouping abilities of the brain that seemingly could never be dupli catedl although, according to Gleick, there has been much progress m3de toward JlI?lk.ing the canpIter a IlPre subtie instrument. Hofstad ter does not use the typical problem-solving approach which asks the grand question and then works through· processes until the minu tiae are solved.
Rather, Hofstadter starts with the minutiae, that asp:ct of the Problem which has only the IlPSt Peri];heral CXJIUlection with the larger Problem he is solving, and by canbining, associating, and regrouping the data, he attempts to arrive at a process that reseobles the workings of the human mind.
But it is also clear that animals share these same abilities of Perception, IIIe1rory, analogy, and regrouping. Hofstadter and his colleagues would do well to take a closer look at the abilities of animals before they tackle human intelligence.
Gleick quotes Professor Marvin Minsky of M.I.T., who is both a supporter and a critic of Hofstadter' s work:
Nobody's ever tried to make a ma chine that could build a bird' s nest.
Instead they're all out there in the factories asseobling IlPtors.
People say, oh yes, the bird gets straws and sticks them in a nest and glues them in.
But a IlPtor is designed to be put toge ther.
The debris lying around on the forest floor ian't designed to be made into nests. [8] '!hus, the ability of a bird to take things that have CXJIUlection to one another and rem:>ve and reassemble them into a struc ture that has coherence and function is sane thing that no machine has been able to a chieve.
The processes are creative and sub tie.
'!he African lowland gorilla, likewise, will build a new nest in the trees everyday out of forest matter while on his foraging rounds in the jungle. And is the whole set of interrelated mental images of the flow of events1 they may be close at hand in time and space like a toothache or raoote as in an astro ncmer's concept of stellar evolu tion. An Intention:
involves mental i mages of events in which the in tender pictures himself as a parti ciPant and makes a choice as to which image he will bring to reali ty. [9] Combining these features, Griffin then formulates a working definition:
"'!he pre sence of mental images and their use by an animal to regulate its behavior Provide a pragmatic definition of consciousness." [lO] Mental experiences involve not just the im mediate flow of sensations to the brain's sensory canplex but also their filtering through the lens of IIIe1rory and association. As a result, mental images IIPVe fran the passive realm to the active when an organism denonstrates intentionality. Intentionality here is seen in both its P1enanenological sense-that of an organism's consciousness apprehending the external world-and also in the sense that an organism "intends" actions that Project into the future.
To illustrate a rapid fire process of mental experiences and intentionality, we will take the example of a fox chasing a rabbit.
'!he fox senses that the rabbit is real and is food.
As it
IlPVes over the terrain, the fox must intend to act en its environment by leaping boul ders, changing course, and, perhaps, by anti cipating the IlPVeltleI1ts of its prey. The raw sensory data (mental experiences) cc.mbine with mental images of measurement and IlPtien and food, etc., to elicit choices for new IlOVelIe1ts which fonn a rapid and continuous stream of events.
In additien to demJIlStrating the process of intentionality, which is a fundamental characteristic of consciousness, one can also note the presence of other sensations in this scenario--hunger for the fox, fear for the rabbit, and, possibly, desperation for both of them.
These animals, by their behavior, dennnstrate sensations that we can observe and measure (endocrine releases and other physiological events).
And by the fact that humans experience hanologous events and reac tions, we can equate the animals' sensations to our own sensations of pain, fear, hunger, etc.
Ccmnunication is an important element of consciouSness.
Two important forms of can numication are ccmnuni.cation with the envi ronment and ccmnun.ication between members of the same species.
As an example of the for mer, Griffin cites the case of certain spe cies of birds who apparently are able to use the magnetic alignment of the earth and star p3.tterns to aid them in their migrations. He also discusses the activities of echolocating bats that use echoes to negotiate the canplex labyrinths of tmderground caves.
Both of these examples suggest that these species must have a changing awareness of their envi rorunent and must redirect their behavior as new information becanes available.
In the case of the echolocating bats, which Griffin nicknames "Andrea Doria bats," he cites data showing that the bats will meroorize their environment and often pay only cursory atten tion as they fly through the caves.
If new objects are put in the cave, the bats will often collide with them (hence "Andrea Dor ia, II a ship that collided with another one despite the presence of radar).
This dEm:)Il strates that they were flying by I1BOC)ry and did not expect the new objects. He learned that bees returning to the hive fran their foraging afield do a type of dance to camnmicate to other bees vital information about food sources, their abun dance, their direction and distance fran the hive, and even information to the effect that they may have found a better place for the hive to locate in the event of a swarm. Bees may forage up to three miles fran the hive, and the bee's sense of distance and direction as it forages is probably derived fran the location of the sun, plus its sense of land marks on its journeys. other bees will dance and camnmi.cate information about their own journeys, and there will be a little canpari son shopping before m:>re bees are dispatched to the !lOst premising food sources.
'!hese and other examples of animal beha vior are used by Griffin to refute the argu ments of linguists, such as Noam Chansky, and ethologists, such as Konrad Lorenz, that the difference between humans and animals can be seen in the former's use of language.
Chan sky and others postulate sixteen design fea tures of human camnmi.cation that differ fran those of animals.
But upon closer examina tion, Griffin suggests, these are widely shared by animals, as well, or there is no clear evidence that they are actually unique to humans.
These include vocal-aUl'li tory exchange, interchangeability (animals can be both transmitters and receivers), specialization (energy in the signal is small canpared to the effect triggered by it), arbitrariness (how rigidly reproduced are the signals and their information content), dis creteness (hC7;f discrete are the individual units of camnmi.cation, i.e., words or syl lables versus the single cycle of the honey bee waggle dance), etc.
In every case. the distinction between the supposedly unique characteristic of human camnmication and the animal camnmication blurs and becanes altzost meaningless. Final ly, Griffin quotes Alfred North Whitehead:
The distinction between man and animal is in one sense only a dif ference in degree.
But the extent of the degree makes all the differ ence.
The Rubicon has been cros sed. [11] '!hat is, animals share all or IOOSt of the distinguishing characteristics of human lan guage and camnmication which are the marks of consciousness.
'!he main difference seems to be the quantitative degree and breadth of human language which is what really distin guishes our species fran others.
Yet there can be no doubt that the sum of these quanti tative differences leaves a great gulf be tween humans and lIDst other animal species.
'!he intriguing exception to this rule may be dolpuns and whales, who have brain size to 35 BRIWEEN THE SPOCIES body mass ratios canparable to our own. Dr. John Lilly has pioneered in the study of the intricate language patterns of many of these species, especially the bottle nose dolphins. He remains convinced that they are every bit as intelligent as humans, an:! considerably rrore benign, as well.
Conclusion
'lbe work of behaviorists, linguists, an:! ethologists has failed to define any quality that humans possess that is not also pos sessed to some degree in other animals, es pecially the higher mamnals. 'lbe subtle bias of these scientists has been to reduce the status of humans to the level of other ani mals which are seen as mere stimulus/response machines. But Donald Griffin argues, and the data can certainly support the idea, that we should, instead, see animals as beings that are Imlch rrore kindred to ourselves. To para phrase Whitehead, our abilities seem to be those of degree and not of kirrl.
We have
